課程名稱 |
性質理論 Theories of Property |
開課學期 |
102-2 |
授課對象 |
文學院 哲學系 |
授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
課號 |
Phl4835 |
課程識別碼 |
104 47100 |
班次 |
|
學分 |
3 |
全/半年 |
半年 |
必/選修 |
選修 |
上課時間 |
星期五7,8,9(14:20~17:20) |
上課地點 |
普202 |
備註 |
(C)哲學專題群組,群組課程請參閱本系網頁修業課程規定(101學年度入學學生適用)。 總人數上限:80人 |
Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1022Phl4835_ |
課程簡介影片 |
|
核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
課程大綱
|
為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
|
課程概述 |
本課程將會介紹關於性質本體論之相關哲學討論。本體論是哲學裡其中一個最基本的領域,其主要關懷在於回答關於「存在什麼?」之問題。自古希臘以來直至當代,本體論中的一個核心爭辯就是關於性質是否存在(或以什麼方式存在)之討論。對此問題的答案,包含了實在論、唯名論、概念論等,皆會在本課程中詳細研讀。
此外,本課程亦會處理以下幾個相關的問題:(1)共相與個體之間是否有嚴格的區分?若有,該如何區分?(2)有沒有不被任何東西擁有的性質?(3)是否對於語言中任何一個描述都有一個對應的性質?是否有「非白色」、「白色或圓形」這類的性質?(4)有沒有兩個不同的性質是被完全一樣的東西所擁有的?有沒有兩個不同的東西具有完全一樣的性質?(5)有沒有兩個不同的性質是擁有完全一樣的因果效力?有沒有任何性質是完全沒有因果效力的?
|
課程目標 |
本課程目標是使學生
(1) 理解關於共相的實在論與唯名論爭辯
(2) 理解殊相理論的哲學動機
|
課程要求 |
待補 |
預期每週課後學習時數 |
|
Office Hours |
|
指定閱讀 |
待補 |
參考書目 |
Introductory Readings:
Mellor, D.H. and Oliver, A. eds., Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Armstrong, D.M., Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder: Westview, 1989.
MacBride, F., ‘Universals: The Contemporary Debate’, in R. Le Poidevin et al. eds., The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 276-85.
Further readings:
Frege, G., ‘Function and Concept’, Reprinted in M. Beaney ed., The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
Frege, G., ‘On Concept and Object’, Reprinted in M. Beaney ed., The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
Dummett, M., ‘The Reference of Incomplete Expression’ , Frege: Philosophy of Language, 1973, pp.204-244.
Wright, C., ‘Why Frege Does not Deserve His Grain of Salt’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 55, 1998, pp. 239-63.
Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, Routledge,1893.
Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912.
Ramsey, P.F., ‘Universals’, Mind, 1925, 34: 401-417.
Strawson, P.F., Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen, 1959.
MacBride, F., ‘The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?’ Mind, 2005, 114: 565-614.
Simons, P., ‘Ramsey, Particulars and Universals’, Theoria, 1991, 57: 150-61.
Moore, G. E., ‘Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1923, Suppl. vol. 3, pp. 95-113.
Stout, G. F., ‘Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1923, Suppl. vol. 3, pp. 114-22.
Stout, G. F., ‘The Nature of Universals and Propositions’, Proceedings of the British Academy X, 1921, pp. 157-72.
Williams, D.C., ‘On the Elements of Being’, Review of Metaphysics, 1953, 7: 3-18.
Campbell, K., ‘The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, 1981, 6: 477-78.
Maurin, A.-S., ‘Bradley and the relation regress’, If Tropes, Kluwer, 2002.
Simons, P., ‘Relations and Truthmaking’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2010, Suppl. Vol. 84, pp. 199-213.
MacBride, F., ‘Relations and Truth-Making’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111, 2011, pp. 161-79.
Quine, W.V., ‘On What There Is’, Review of Metaphysics, 1948, 2: 21-28.
Devitt, M., ‘Ostrich Nominalism or Mirage Realism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1980, 61: 433-39.
Armstrong, D.M., ‘Against “Ostrich Nominalism”: A Reply to Devitt’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1980,61: 440-49.
Armstrong, D.M., Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder: Westview, 1989.
Armstrong, D.M., Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Lewis, D., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
Lewis, D., ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1983, 61: 343-77.
Lewis, D., ‘Against Structural Universals’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1986, 64: 25-46.
Armstrong, D.M., ‘In Defence of Structural Universals’, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1986, 64: 85-88.
Shoemaker, S., ‘Causality and Properties’, in Peter van Inwagen ed., Time and Cause, D. Reidel, 1980.
Mellor, D.H., ‘Properties and Predicates’, in Bacon, Campbell and Reinhardt eds., Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essay in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
|
評量方式 (僅供參考) |
No. |
項目 |
百分比 |
說明 |
1. |
期中論文 |
40% |
兩千字以內。4月25日前交 |
2. |
期末論文 |
60% |
三千字以內。6月20日前交 |
|
週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
第1週 |
2/21 |
Classical Realism: Plato's Theory of Forms |
第2週 |
2/28 |
Holiday (no class) |
第3週 |
3/07 |
Classical Conceptualism: the Medieval Theories of Universals |
第4週 |
3/14 |
Bradley's Regress: Unities in Complexity |
第5週 |
3/21 |
Moore and Russell on Universals: the Bundle Theory |
第6週 |
3/28 |
Frege's dichotomy |
第7週 |
4/04 |
Holiday (no class) |
第8週 |
4/11 |
Ramsey's sceptism |
第9週 |
4/18 |
Midterm |
第10週 |
4/25 |
W.E. Johnson and the determinable-determinate distinction |
第11週 |
5/02 |
Stout and the the trope theory |
第12週 |
5/09 |
Carnap and the resemblance nominalism |
第13週 |
5/16 |
Quine and the so-called ostrich nominalism |
第14週 |
5/23 |
David Lewis and Natural Properties |
第15週 |
5/30 |
Armstrong and Truthmaking |
第16週 |
6/06 |
Truthmaking and Post-Quinean Ontologies |
第17週 |
6/13 |
Recent Works |
|